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 OPINION**  
_________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 In November 2012, Vernon Hankins tragically died when the root ball of a tree on 
his property uprighted and crushed him.  The tree had fallen weeks earlier during Super 
Storm Sandy.  According to his wife, April Hankins, Mr. Hankins was underneath the root 
ball that day because the claims adjuster for the property had advised them to refill the hole 
                                              
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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in the ground where the tree once stood.  After Mr. Hankins’s death, Ms. Hankins sued the 
insurance company, Philadelphia Contributionship Insurance Company, its claims service 
provider, Crawford and Company, and the claims adjuster, J. Clay Kincaid.  The District 
Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that Mr. Hankins’s tragic 
accident was unforeseeable as a matter of law.  We disagree, and will vacate and remand 
for further proceedings.  
 
In 2012, April and Vernon Hankins owned two neighboring properties in Brick 
Township, New Jersey: 1 Nejecho Drive and 302 Mantoloking Road.  Both properties 
suffered damage during Super Storm Sandy in October 2012.  Importantly for this case, a 
tree fell between the two houses.  The root ball of the tree was approximately twelve to 
fifteen feet in width and left a shallow, one-and-a-half-foot hole in the ground where the 
tree once stood. 
After the storm, Ms. Hankins contacted her insurer, Philadelphia Contributionship 
Insurance Company, to report claims for the properties.  Philadelphia Contributionship, in 
turn, had a claim service agreement with Crawford and Company, under which Crawford 
provided catastrophe claim services for Philadelphia Contributionship insureds.  Crawford 
assigned the Hankins’ claims to J. Clay Kincaid, who was a catastrophe field claim 
representative.   
The heart of Ms. Hankins’s claim is that when Kincaid visited the properties on 
November 2, 2012, he gave the family negligent instructions about the fallen tree.  By the 
time Kincaid toured the property, some of the tree limbs had already been cut away, but 
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the trunk was intact.  Kincaid did not believe that the tree was dangerous in that condition 
because the weight of the tree trunk counterbalanced the root ball and would prevent it 
from falling back into the hole in the ground, a phenomenon known as “uprighting.”1  
Kincaid advised the Hankinses that the hole should be backfilled with soil because it left 
part of the foundation of the Mantoloking property exposed.2  Kincaid’s specific words, 
and the message they conveyed, are disputed by the parties.  According to Ms. Hankins, 
Kincaid said, “[Y]ou need to get in that hole and backfill it by hand.”3  Ms. Hankins took 
from this that she and her husband were to find soil and fill the hole left by the root ball 
themselves.  According to Kincaid, Ms. Hankins was not present for the conversation and 
he never told Mr. Hankins to get underneath the root ball or to backfill the area himself.   
Kincaid purportedly did not discuss tree removal with Mr. Hankins because that was 
not covered under the insurance policy.  Although Kincaid was familiar with the risk that 
an exposed root ball without sufficient counterweight could upright, he admits he did not 
tell Mr. Hankins not to cut back any more of the tree.  Nevertheless, he assumed that at 
some point the tree would be cut back.  He did not warn Mr. Hankins that it could be 
dangerous to stand in the hole before the tree was fully removed or that the tree might 
become dangerous if it were cut back further. 
                                              
1 A.A. 409. 
2 Kincaid later stated that the hole was not damaging the property’s foundation; instead, he 
included it on a claims form in order to maximize the Hankins’ recovery so they had enough 
money for a professional tree removal service.  
3 A.A. 224. 
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At some point after the inspection, one of the Hankins’s neighbors, David Cottrell, 
offered to help Mr. Hankins remove the tree.  Cottrell and another neighbor, Keith Arasz, 
worked to cut the tree trunk away from the root ball.4  After cutting away the trunk, they 
attempted to push the root ball back into the hole but were unable to do so.  Arasz advised 
Mr. Hankins to use a chain and pickup truck to pull the root ball back into the hole. 
On the morning of November 22, 2012—Thanksgiving—Mr. Hankins went to do 
some work on the properties.  He realized he forgot his keys and called Ms. Hankins to 
bring them to him.  When she arrived, she saw Mr. Hankins standing in the hole underneath 
the root ball with what looked like a rake or shovel.  He turned to her and appeared to be 
stepping out of the hole when the root ball suddenly uprighted, tragically crushing him.  
Shortly thereafter, he was pronounced dead. 
On October 23, 2014, Ms. Hankins brought this negligence suit against Kincaid, 
Crawford, and PCIC, alleging that they had wrongfully caused her husband’s death.5  
  
                                              
4 Arasz was employed by the New Jersey Turnpike Authority, and part of his job duties 
involved tree removal.  
5 The suit involves five causes of action:  (1) wrongful death pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. 
2A:15-3; (2) wrongful death recovery for the Estate of Vernon Hankins pursuant to N.J. 
Stat. Ann. 2A:31-1; (3) suffering and wrongful death on behalf of the Estate and April 
Hankins individually; (4) emotional trauma on behalf of April Hankins; and (5) intentional 
and willful misconduct.  The complaint also included a request for leave to amend to add 
additional defendants, which was labeled as Count Two. 
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To establish negligence, a plaintiff must show “a duty of care owed by the defendant 
to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty by the defendant, injury to the plaintiff proximately 
caused by the breach, and damages.”7  The District Court granted summary judgment to 
all Defendants, concluding that Ms. Hankins had not shown a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether her husband’s fatal injury was foreseeable to Mr. Kincaid.  He also 
determined that the neighbors’ actions in cutting down most of the tree constituted a 
superseding cause as a matter of law.  As explained below, we disagree. 
A. Proximate Cause 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has explained that proximate cause “is that 
combination of ‘logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent’ that fixes a point in 
a chain of events, some foreseeable and some unforeseeable, beyond which the law will 
bar recovery.”8  “So long as the injury or harm suffered was within the realm of reasonable 
contemplation, the injury or harm is foreseeable.”9  Because the foreseeability 
determination often requires a close analysis of facts, it is generally a jury issue.10 
This case encapsulates why thorny questions of proximate cause are best left for the 
                                              
6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.     
7 Robinson v. Vivirito, 86 A.3d 119, 124 (N.J. 2014) (citations omitted).  
8 People Exp. Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 116 (N.J. 1985) 
(quoting Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 222 A.2d 513, 517 (N.J. 1966)). 
9 Komlodi v. Picciano, 89 A.3d 1234, 1251 (N.J. 2014) (citation omitted). 
10 Id. at 1252. 
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jury.  First, there is conflicting record evidence about the risk the tree posed after it had 
fallen, but before it was cut back by Arasz and Cottrell.  Appellees’ expert, Steve Chisolm, 
explained that uprooted trees like the one on the Hankins’s property are “obviously” under 
stress and tension.11  Chisolm further testified that wood under tension may behave or react 
unpredictably.  He stated that he would not recommend work around or on a fallen tree 
given the possibility of getting hurt.  Kincaid also testified that he was aware of the 
possibility that a tree that is still partially attached by the root ball could spontaneously 
stand back up.  Arasz, who had significant professional experience with tree removal, 
explained that he would not have gotten into the hole underneath the fallen tree because he 
had seen bigger trees upright.  
But Kincaid, Chisolm, and Arasz also testified that the tree was not dangerous on 
the day Kincaid went to the property, before it was cut back.  Chisolm had never heard of 
a tree that size spontaneously uprighting, and explained that a tree with such a significant 
amount of trunk attached was “not gonna move.”12  Chisolm also testified that so long as 
the tree was being cut back properly, it would never pose a risk of uprighting.  Kincaid 
testified that he climbed over the tree at several points during his visit.  Thus, the record is 
unclear about the extent to which the tree, as it was on the day Kincaid visited, posed a risk 
of danger to the Hankinses.  Even if the tree were not in a dangerous condition on that day, 
a jury could reasonably conclude that the risk of danger as the tree was cut back further 
was significant enough that it was foreseeable it would cause harm to an individual 
                                              
11 A.A. 394. 
12 A.A. 408.  
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attempting to get underneath the root ball. 
Second, there is conflicting evidence about what Kincaid told the Hankinses.  Ms. 
Hankins recalls that Kincaid told them that they needed to get under the root ball to backfill 
the hole left in the ground.  Kincaid recalls explaining that he would add a line item 
regarding the cost to backfill the hole into the insurance estimate, but did not instruct the 
Hankinses to do it themselves.  This presents a classic factual dispute that must be resolved 
by a jury.  If Kincaid instructed Mr. Hankins to get into the hole, a jury could reasonably 
conclude that the risk harm would come to Mr. Hankins was “within the realm of 
reasonable contemplation,” given that the tree was under significant tension.13  
Additionally, although Kincaid explained that the weight of the tree trunk counterbalanced 
the weight of the root ball, he testified that he was aware the tree would likely be cut back 
further after his visit.  The risk of the tree uprighting would increase as the trunk continued 
to be cut back.  A jury could therefore conclude from this testimony that if Kincaid 
instructed the Hankinses to backfill the hole but did not advise them about the risk the tree 
could pose as it was cut back, it would be foreseeable that they would be injured while 
working under the tree. 
In short, given the significant disputes over Kincaid’s instructions and the unclear 
evidence on the risks of working on or around a fallen tree, we cannot say at this stage that 
the harm that befell Mr. Hankins was unforeseeable as a matter of law.   
  
                                              
13 Komlodi, 89 A.3d at 1251. 
9 
 
B. Superseding Cause 
The District Court also concluded that any chain of causation was broken because 
of a “superseding cause”—here, the fact that Cottrell and Arasz cut back the tree trunk but 
left the root ball exposed.14  When a plaintiff’s injury is a result of a “superseding cause,” 
it “breaks the chain of proximate causation,” and liability cannot lie with the defendant.15 
But when the intervening cause was foreseeable, then that does not “break the chain of 
causation [or] relieve a defendant of liability.”16   
The District Court explained that Mr. Hankins agreed to let Cottrell and Arasz 
remove the tree, they removed the trunk but could not push down the root ball, and they 
then explained to Mr. Hankins that he should use a chain and a pick-up truck to get the root 
ball back into the hole.  After knowing all of that, “Mr. Hankins, nevertheless, got into the 
hole, under the root ball, and a tragic accident ensued.”17  The District Court concluded 
that the series of events unfolded in a way that was “sufficiently unrelated and 
unanticipated by Mr. Kincaid” so as to relieve him of liability for Mr. Hankins’s death.18 
While a jury may ultimately agree with the District Court and conclude that the 
events that transpired after Kincaid’s visit broke the chain of proximate causation, we do 
not think the issue is so clear-cut that it may be resolved as a matter of law.  While it is 
undisputed that Cottrell and Arasz cut back the trunk of the tree, Kincaid testified that he 
                                              
14 Hankins v. Philadelphia Contributionship Ins. Co., No. 15-203, 2018 WL 515817, at *6 
(D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2018). 
15 Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2011).   
16 Komlodi, 89 A.3d at 1252. 
17 Hankins, 2018 WL 515817, at *6. 
18 Id. 
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expected that the tree would be further cut back after he visited the property.  Kincaid 
expected that the Hankinses would use a professional service to remove the tree,19 but a 
jury could find the incomplete removal of the tree was foreseeable regardless of whether a 
professional or an experienced neighbor was the one responsible.  Finally, the record is 
unclear as to whether Arasz warned Hankins that the root ball was in a dangerous position 
after the trunk was removed.20  Certainly, if Arasz did warn Mr. Hankins, and Mr. Hankins 
decided to get beneath the root ball anyway, his actions could constitute a superseding 
cause of his demise.  But that question must be  
decided by a jury.  As it stands, Ms. Hankins has shown significant issues of fact 
with respect to the question of proximate causation, and we believe the grant of summary 
judgment against her on these grounds was error.   
 
 Because the District Court ended its inquiry after determining that the cutting 
back of the tree was a superseding cause, it did not address either of the two additional 
arguments the parties raised before use:  whether Kincaid owed a duty to Mr. and Ms. 
Hankins, and whether Philadelphia Contributionship is vicariously liable for Kincaid’s 
actions.  We believe the arguments of the parties should be addressed by the District Court 
in the first instance.   
                                              
19 Ms. Hankins contests that her husband told Kincaid they planned to hire professionals.  
However, she does not point to any evidence in the record to support her denial.  
20 At one point during his deposition, Arasz stated that he warned Mr. Hankins “that [the 
tree] could upright.”  A.A. 363.  He did not recall, however, whether he warned Mr. 
Hankins about the danger of the tree uprighting.   
11 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the order of the District Court and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
